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"Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom: Summary and Review

Line drawing of a round pasture fenced with posts and a dotted gate at the bottom, six animals spaced evenly around a large filled patch of grass in the middleLine drawing of a round pasture fenced with posts and a dotted gate at the bottom, six animals spaced evenly around a large filled patch of grass in the middle

9 min read≈ 2,040 words5 questions · up to 5 points

What this is about

In 2009 the Nobel Prize in economics went for the first time to a woman, a political scientist who had spent decades reading about Swiss pastures, Spanish canals and Californian wells. You learn the main steps of her best-known book, the eight design principles, and how it compares with Olson, Axelrod and Roth. You also learn what critics found missing and how to read a demanding academic text without getting lost.

The book in three sentences· skip ahead

Ostrom argues that a resource many people share does not have to end in ruin or be handed to the state or to private owners. Comparing long-lived and failed cases from Switzerland, Japan, Spain, the Philippines, California, Turkey and Sri Lanka, she shows that users can make, watch and enforce their own rules. Lasting commons share eight design principles, which turn the tragedy of the commons from a law into a problem with solutions.

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Author
Elinor Ostrom
Published
1990
Publisher
Cambridge University Press, Canto Classics edition, 2015
Length
294 pages
Audiobook
10h 25m, read by Kathleen Godwin
Best for
Readers who want the evidence behind the claim that communities can manage shared resources themselves, and who can handle an academic book with some game theory.

For most of the twentieth century, economists had two answers to the question of who should run a shared pasture, forest or fishing ground: the state or private owners. Elinor Ostrom, a political scientist at Indiana University, spent decades collecting evidence for a third answer, the people who use the resource. Governing the Commons (1990) brought that evidence together, and in 2009 it helped make her the first woman to receive the Nobel Prize in economics. This review explains the book’s main steps, compares it with three neighbors, and says where critics found it too narrow.

Hardin’s tragedy and two other models are not laws of nature

Ostrom starts from three “influential models” that seem to prove that people who share a resource will ruin it. The first is Garrett Hardin’s tragedy of the commons from 1968. Each herder gains the full benefit of one more cow, while the cost of the overgrazed pasture is shared by all, so every herder adds cows until the pasture is ruined. The second is the prisoner’s dilemma, a game in which each player does better by betraying the other, so both end up worse off than if they had cooperated. The third is Mancur Olson’s argument from 1965 that members of a large group will not work for their common interest unless they are forced or given private rewards, the argument explained in What Is the Free-Rider Problem?.

Ostrom does not say these models are wrong. Her objection is to their use as metaphors for every real commons. The models assume that the users cannot change the rules of their situation, and from that assumption policy advisers concluded that only an outside power can help. In chapter 1 she calls the two resulting recipes “Leviathan as the ‘only’ way”, meaning control by the state, and “Privatization as the ‘only’ way”, meaning division into private property. Both recipes, she argues, assume that the people on the spot know and can do nothing. What she observes in the world is that neither the state nor the market reliably keeps natural resources productive over the long term.

As an alternative, Ostrom first changes Hardin’s game on paper: the herders agree among themselves how to share the pasture and choose someone to enforce the agreement. Then she gives a real case. Inshore fishers at Alanya, on Turkey’s south coast, had suffered from conflict over the best fishing spots. Starting in the early 1970s, and after more than a decade of trial and error, they built a system in which the usable spots are listed before each season, assigned by lottery and rotated, so that everyone gets the same chances at the good spots.

A “common-pool resource” poses three puzzles

The book’s central term is the common-pool resource, or CPR: a resource from which it is costly to exclude users, and where every unit one person takes is no longer available to others. A lake is a CPR, and so are a groundwater basin and a pasture. Ostrom calls the people who take from it appropriators, and she separates the resource itself, such as the fishing ground, from the units taken out of it, such as the fish.

In chapter 2 she names three puzzles that any group of users must solve without an outside ruler. The first is supply: making new rules is itself a shared effort from which each person is tempted to hold back, so who pays for the work of designing them? The second is credible commitment: why should anyone keep a rule when breaking it would pay? The third is mutual monitoring: someone has to watch, and watching costs time. A company solves these problems with a boss, and a state solves them with officials. Ostrom wants to know how a community of equals solves them, and she studies small systems because there the answer can be observed.

Some commons have lasted for centuries under their users’ rules

Chapter 3 presents the book’s most famous evidence: commons whose rules were made by the users and which have survived for a very long time. The youngest institution in the chapter is over 100 years old, and the oldest over 1,000. They survived droughts, floods, wars and political upheavals.

  • Törbel, Switzerland. Farmers in this village in the canton of Valais have managed their alpine pastures, forests and water channels together since at least an agreement of 1483. Ostrom draws on the anthropologist Robert Netting, who reported an old rule that no one may send more cows to the summer pasture than they can feed through the winter.
  • Hirano, Nagaike and Yamanoka, Japan. These mountain villages shared forests and meadows for centuries, with rules about who may cut what, and when.
  • The huertas of Spain. Farmers around Valencia, Murcia, Orihuela and Alicante share canal water under rules that are centuries old. In Valencia, a court of elected farmers, the Water Tribunal, still meets every Thursday at the door of the cathedral.
  • The zanjeras of the Philippines. In Ilocos Norte, farmers’ associations rebuild river dams that floods wash away, and each member’s share of the land comes with a fixed share of the work.

Ostrom stresses that these rules were not right from the start. They lasted because the users could change them as conditions changed.

Eight “design principles” mark the commons that last

At the end of chapter 3, Ostrom asks what the lasting cases have in common, and she answers with eight design principles:

  1. Clear boundaries: everyone knows who may use the resource and where it ends.
  2. Rules that fit local conditions, with costs that match benefits.
  3. Collective-choice arrangements: most people affected by the rules can help change them.
  4. Monitoring by people who are users or who answer to the users.
  5. Graduated sanctions: a first offense brings a small penalty, repeated offenses larger ones.
  6. Quick, cheap and local ways to settle conflicts.
  7. Minimal recognition of the users’ right to organize by the government.
  8. Nested enterprises: for larger systems, these activities are organized in several layers.

The principles explain each other. Monitoring is cheap where users watch each other as part of the work, and small first penalties keep honest people in the system after an occasional mistake.

Many readers took the list as a recipe. Ostrom later said that she meant something weaker: patterns found in lasting systems, which the farmers and fishers did not have in mind when they made their rules.

Perhaps I should have used the term “best practices” to describe the rules and structure of robust institutions.

Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Prize lecture (2009), note 5

New institutions grow step by step, as in Los Angeles

Chapter 4 asks how such systems begin, because in the old cases “The origins of these systems are lost in time.” To see an origin, Ostrom turns to the groundwater basins under the Los Angeles area, which she had first studied for her doctoral dissertation in 1965. In the first half of the twentieth century, the pumpers there were in a competitive pumping race, in which each one pumped as much as possible before the others could. The water table fell, and along the coast salt water began to enter the West Basin.

The users did not wait for the state to save them. Ostrom shows how they formed voluntary associations and went to court to have each user’s pumping right fixed and reduced, first in the Raymond Basin and then in the West and Central Basins. Later they created special districts that could bring in outside water to refill the basins. She calls the result a “polycentric” system, meaning one with many centers of decision: courts, associations, water districts and private firms each played a part. Her lesson is that new institutions often grow in small steps, each of which makes the next one possible, and that this works best under a government that allows and supports such local efforts.

Commons fail when users cannot control entry or outsiders override them

Chapter 5 turns to failures, which make the principles more convincing because they show what happens when they are missing. Unlike the fishers of Alanya, fishers in Bodrum and the Bay of Izmir built no such rules, and both places suffered from overcrowding and lost income. A coastal fishery in Sri Lanka had a fair rotation but could not stop newcomers from joining, so profits fell year after year. In Sri Lanka’s large irrigation projects, governments and donors spent heavily and reorganized the administration again and again without winning the farmers’ cooperation. Only when farmers in one large system were allowed to organize without a ready-made plan did things improve.

Chapter 6 draws the threads together in a framework for how users weigh the costs and benefits of new rules. Ostrom notes that some successful cases created tradable water rights, but the resources never became private property, and “none of the success cases involved direct regulation by a centralized authority.” The mix of public and private was the rule, and she warns against any single solution imposed from outside.

How it differs from other books on cooperation

Three neighbors show what is special about the book. Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (1965) is one of the three models Ostrom criticizes. Olson explains with theory why large groups fail to act, while Ostrom tests that kind of prediction against field evidence and finds many groups that succeed, mostly small ones.

Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) shows with computer tournaments that cooperation can arise when the same players meet again and again. Ostrom’s users are in exactly such repeated situations, but she adds what Axelrod leaves out: written rules, monitors, fines, courts and the long work of building them. Those tournaments and their limits are explained in “The Evolution of Cooperation” by Robert Axelrod: Summary and Review.

Alvin Roth’s book on market design, reviewed in “Who Gets What and Why” by Alvin E. Roth: Summary and Review, shares Ostrom’s interest in rules that make shared systems work. The difference lies in who designs them: in Roth’s book economists design the rules for doctors and schools, while in Ostrom’s the users design their own. The book is also the main answer to the problem described in What Is the Tragedy of the Commons?, and reading the two together shows both the trap and the ways out.

Where it falls short

The book has three main weaknesses. The first is its style. It is a scholarly monograph, full of technical terms, game matrices and references, and the theory chapters 2 and 6 are hard work for a general reader.

The second is scale. The largest system in the book serves about 15,000 users, and most are villages in which people know each other. The book says little about commons with millions of users and no shared meeting place, such as the climate or the high seas, and Ostrom turned to those questions only in later work.

The third concerns power and evidence. In 2003 the political scientist Arun Agrawal argued that the research that followed the book had found more relevant conditions than small samples of cases can test. He also found too little attention to inequality and to the wider politics around a village. The principles themselves have held up well: in 2010 Michael Cox and two colleagues checked them against 91 later studies, found them well supported, and split three of them into more precise parts.

Which edition to read

Read it in print or as an ebook. The Canto Classics paperback of 2015 reprints the original text of 1990, so page references in other books still fit. An audiobook exists, narrated by Kathleen Godwin, but the game matrices, tables and long definitions are hard to follow by ear. A good way through the book is chapter 1, then the cases in chapters 3 and 5, then the Los Angeles story in chapter 4, leaving the theory in chapters 2 and 6 for a slower second reading. If you only want the principles, Ostrom’s free Nobel lecture of 2009 gives an updated list in a few pages.

Quiz

5 questions · up to 5 points

Open a question and pick one answer. Only your first answer counts: +1 if it is right, −1 if it is wrong.

  1. What is Ostrom's main objection to the policy advice built on Hardin's tragedy of the commons, the prisoner's dilemma and Olson's logic of collective action?
    Show answer

    It treats the users as trapped in fixed rules, so only the state or private owners seem able to help, although real users often change the rules themselves. Ostrom accepts the logic of the models but says they assume people cannot change their own situation. Her cases show users who did.

  2. A village shares a forest. Anyone may enter, the rules come from a ministry far away, and nobody checks how much wood each family takes. Which of Ostrom's design principles are missing?
    Show answer

    Clear boundaries, rules made with the users, and monitoring by people who answer to the users. The lasting commons in Ostrom's book know who may use the resource, let users help make the rules, and have monitors who are users or accountable to them.

  3. How, according to Ostrom, did the water users of the Los Angeles groundwater basins stop their pumping race?
    Show answer

    Step by step: they formed associations, went to court to fix and cut each user's pumping rights, and set up special districts to bring in more water. Ostrom describes institutional change that was incremental and used courts, voluntary associations and local public bodies together.

  4. Fishers on the coast of Sri Lanka had a rotation that shared the risks of fishing fairly. Why did their profits still keep falling, according to Ostrom?
    Show answer

    They could not stop newcomers from joining, so too many people fished the same water. Ostrom's failed and fragile cases often lack clear boundaries. The rotation worked, but without control of entry the gains were spread over more and more boats.

  5. How does this review suggest you read Governing the Commons?
    Show answer

    In print or as an ebook, starting with the case chapters and the design principles, and taking the theory chapters more slowly. The cases and principles carry the argument, while the theory chapters use game matrices, tables and technical terms that are hard to follow by ear.

The takeaway

Governing the Commons argues that people who share a pasture, a fishery or a water supply can avoid ruin by making their own rules, so neither the state nor private property is the only solution. Ostrom shows this with commons that lasted for centuries, with the slow building of groundwater institutions in Los Angeles and with failures, and she sums up the lasting cases in eight design principles. The book is dense and academic, and it covers mainly small, local resources. Read it to judge any shared resource by its rules: who may use it, who watches, and who punishes.

Key quotes

“What one can observe in the world, however, is that neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems.”
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, chapter 1
“The origins of these systems are lost in time.”
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, chapter 4

Should you read it?

Read it if

  • You know the tragedy of the commons and want to see how real villages, fishers and irrigators avoided it.
  • You work with a shared resource, such as water, land, a fishery, a shared budget or open-source code, and want questions to test its rules.
  • You want to understand the work behind the 2009 Nobel Prize in economics from the source.

Skip it if

  • You want an easy popular read; the book is a scholarly monograph full of technical terms.
  • You want solutions for global problems such as climate change; the cases are small and local.
  • You only need the eight principles; a good summary or Ostrom's Nobel lecture gives them in a few pages.

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Ideas from this book

References

  1. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics). Elinor Ostrom, Cambridge University Press, 2015

    The publisher's page for the book, with the chapter list and a summary of each chapter.

  2. Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems. Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Prize lecture, 2009

    Ostrom's own account of the research behind the book, with an updated list of the design principles.

  3. A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management. Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold and Sergio Villamayor Tomás, Ecology and Society, 2010

    Tests the eight principles against 91 later studies, finds them well supported and proposes a refined version.

  4. Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and Politics. Arun Agrawal, Annual Review of Anthropology, 2003

    A critical survey of the research that followed the book, on its methods, its many variables and its view of politics.

governing-the-commonselinor-ostrombook-reviewsummarycommonscommon-pool-resourcestragedy-of-the-commonscollective-actionself-governancedesign-principlesinstitutionsnobel-prize-economicstorbelirrigationfisheriesgroundwatergame-theorypolycentric-governance